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INTERNATIONAL ORDER AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Harold James*
How is international order built, and how is it legitimate, in a
world in which political and economic foundations are rapidly
shifting? The geography of power is being transformed, in particular
by the rise of China. What are the consequence of the rise of major
new powers for the structure and the functioning of the international
system? In the past seismic changes, associated with great wars or
great financial crises, led to a disorientation about the moral
foundations of society, domestically and internationally, and led
literally to confusion and uncertainty about values. Not just in a
technical sense: can we believe in gold as money, in the pound
sterling, or in the U.S. dollar? But also in a broader sense: what is the
best way of ordering an economy, a society, or a polity? How can
policies be legitimated?
An international order is not just an exercise in power
projection. It also is built around a set of ideas. We often like to think
of past versions of order as generated by particular countries which
propagated a grand vision: such as the nineteenth century British
view of John Bright or Richard Cobden about the universal
beneficence of commerce; or the universalization of an American
vision of commercial prosperity in the second half of the twentieth
century. But even visionary international orders do not last forever.
Some events or dates—1688, 1776, 1789, or 1914—mark off an
* Claude and Lore Kelly Professor in European Studies, Professor of History and International Affairs, and Director of the Program in Contemporary
European Politics and Society, Princeton University.
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epochal shift. We are now at one of such great historical caesuras.
What historians will call the “long twentieth century” ended not with
the terrorist attacks of 2001, but with the financial crisis that started
in 2007.
A particular historical example holds a powerful analogy to
the current transition of economic leadership and political power.
Great Britain’s economic position took a bad tumble in the financial
crisis of 1931, when the pound was taken off the gold standard, but it
was only some twenty-five years later that the full implications for
power politics were really felt. In 1956, the humiliating fiasco of the
Suez crisis combined military incompetence and failure with
vulnerability to financial pressure, and marked the end of Britain’s
claims to be an arbiter of the international order.1
There is an obvious parallel between Great Britain at the time
of Suez and the travails of the United States after the 2003 invasion
of Iraq and subsequent confusion at the prospect of a shift of the
geography of economic influence and political power. Americans are
hearing the echoes of another crisis: the financial and economic
disaster of the 1930s that brought about the transition from a world
built around the pax Britannica to the so-called pax Americana of the
late twentieth century. Seeing how that transition of the midtwentieth century was understood may help us grapple with the
challenges of our currently unstable world order. There are two
dimensions of the response, one concerned with the economics of
the world, the other with economic geo-politics.
I
In the Great Depression, it looked as if existing economic
ideas were completely discredited by the severity of the crisis. Today,
there are analogies to that 1930s belief in a need for a paradigm
change. In the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis and the Lehman
1 See DIANE B. KUNZ, THE ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF THE SUEZ
CRISIS (1991); see also BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 57-58, 154-59 (2011) (presenting the Suez crisis as the critical
moment in the collapse of Britain’s currency and claim to international leadership).
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collapse the fingers pointed at the United States as an example of
how badly things could go wrong. It was now generally supposed that
the American model had failed. America’s reputation in the new
millennium took a double whammy, first with the Iraq invasion, then
with the financial crisis. Anyone who dreamt of the American way of
life now looked stupid.
Immediately after Lehman collapsed, the German Finance
Minister, Peer Steinbrück, put this diagnosis as a challenge not just to
the U.S., but to other countries—notably the U.K.—which seemed
to have Americanized their financial system.2 The problem lay in
over-reliance on highly complex financial instruments, propagated by
globalized American institutions. Steinbrück commented: “The
financial crisis is above all an American problem. The other G7
financial ministers in continental Europe share this opinion.”3
Criticism of America did not stop there. His successor Wolfgang
Schäuble continued in the same tone, with comments about
“clueless” American monetary policy that was designed only to feed
the American financial monster.4
Then came the European crisis, with its roots in lax
government finance in some (mostly southern European) countries.
Critics now had a new focus. Naturally, many conservative
Americans were delighted by the imminent failure of what they saw
as a tax and spend society, addicted to a costly and inefficient welfare
state. They were not the only critics. The chairman of China
Investment Corporation, Jin Liquin, commented skeptically on ideas
that China should bailout Europe. It was “a worn-out welfare

See Harold James, Schadenfreude Capitalism, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 4,
2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/schadenfreude-capitalism.
3 Id.; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, U.S. Will Lose Status of Superpower, Says
German Minister Finance Chief Demands Sweeping Market Reform, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 26, 2008, at 1.
4 James, supra note 2; Phillip Inman, G20 Showdown Likely Over Fed’s New
Strategy: China and Germany Attack Quantitative Easing Plan: Bernanke Insists Move Will
Not
Raise
Inflation,
GUARDIAN,
Nov.
8,
2010,
at
26,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/nov/07/g20-quantitative-easing-show
down.
2
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society” with “outdated” welfare laws that induces sloth and
indolence.5
The international criticism of large European transfer
payments may have some justification in that Greek and Italian civil
servants did indeed have possibilities of retiring quite young.
Restrictive labor laws did indeed make it unattractive for many firms
to hire new workers. But the critique only captures one small part of
the European difficulty. The fiscal dilemmas of Greece and Spain
were also the result of spending a great deal on high technology and
high prestige projects, facilities for the Olympic Games, new airport
buildings, and high speed train links.6 Oops. Wasn’t that also an
increasingly important part of the transformation of China since the
1990s?7 Chinese citizens are now frustrated not only with increasingly
obvious imperfections and inadequacies in the high-speed trains, but
also wondering whether their government set the right priorities.
Spain and Ireland before the crisis did not have a fiscal problem,
because of the dynamic growth produced by a real estate boom that
seemed to indicate a new era of economic miracles.8 Oops again. Is
that not a description of how property prices soared in China?
One of the most widely used Chinese terms of recent years is
幸灾乐祸 (xìng zāi lè huò), not easily translated into English but well
rendered by the German word Schadenfreude. Somebody else—some
other society—has simply tripped on an enormous political banana
skin. Asian critics looking at first America and then Europe could
easily convince themselves that the conventional platitudes of liberal
and democratic politics and economics were collapsing. There are
other versions of Schadenfreude too. Vladimir Putin and Christina
Kirchner liked to think that their versions of a controlled economy
and controlled society built in the aftermath of default on foreign
debt offered a more viable alternative to cosmopolitan international
capitalism. Both are now facing major problems with disillusioned
populations.

5
6
7
8

James, supra note 2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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In short, there exist many more common vulnerabilities in
the world’s major economies than is commonly supposed. A
response to global challenges that is simply based on Schadenfreude
may promote a short term sense of wellbeing. In one country or
region, people often like to think how lucky they are to have escaped
the mess that originated elsewhere. But soon they encounter their
own banana skin. Today’s global economy is full of the noise of
slipping and falling economic models. And tomorrow may be even
noisier.
All this erroneous drawing of fallacious conclusions takes us
back into the era of the Great Depression, when the prevailing
wisdom was that liberal economics (derided as old-fashioned laissez
faire)—and also liberal politics had collapsed and that the real future
lay with radical doctrines that reshaped politics but also economics:
fascism, and its more extreme German variant National Socialism, or
Stalin’s version of Soviet communism. It is only relatively recently
that we have washed away the political eyewash and realized quite
how bad the economic performance of the Soviet Union or Nazi
German really was in the 1930s—and we still remember how
Keynes’s leading Cambridge disciple exclaimed that Hitler had solved
unemployment before Keynes had finished explaining what caused
it.9
II
How does economic fortune affect perceptions of the
working of international relations? The winners of late twentieth
century globalization and the beneficiaries of a worldwide shift to
liberalization were the small states: Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong,
New Zealand, Chile, Ireland, Finland, Estonia or Slovenia. Why? In
the first instance, small states are generally quicker and better at
economic liberalization.10 In a small state setting, an imposition of a
dense network of controls is likely to lead to the loss of mobile

See Joan Robinson, What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?, 16
CHALLENGE 1, 7 (1974).
10 See ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS
(2003).
9
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factors of production, while in a large state it is harder for labor or
capital to escape. Large states are thus inclined to control, while
correspondingly small states are likely to be quicker in opening up
their labor markets,11 as well as in reducing rates of taxation on
capital. They not only do deregulation more effectively; paradoxically
they also manage social protection better. Public resources can be
used to compensate the losers of the globalization process, and thus
to make it acceptable to a broad political audience. This model,
pioneered by Scandinavian countries since the 1970s,12 and especially
effectively in the 1990s, has rightly become a widely admired
European ideal.
In debates about international order, the small states are—as
they were in the interwar world too—the natural constituents of a
demand for an overarching supranational international order that
might protect their interests but might also represent a general
interest.
The late twentieth century shift in advantage to the small state
was not a permanent one, and—perhaps since the turn of the
millennium—we can see at work again the classic realist logic
expounded during the interwar period by the British writer E.H.
Carr.13 Advantages fall to powerful and populous states (China,
Russia, the United States) that can dominate or manipulate markets in
energy or other scarce commodities. The previous winners, such as
Swiss banks or Finnish mobile telephony, look vulnerable because
they are not backed by political power. By contrast, big states, like big
banks, have come out of the financial crisis looking stronger.

11 See William Easterly & Aart Kraay, Small States, Small Problems? Income,
Growth, and Volatility in Small States, 28 WORLD DEV. 2013, 2020-22 (2000); see also
Harvey Armstrong & Robert Read, Trade and Growth in Small States: The Impact of
Global Trade Liberalization, 21 WORLD ECON. 563, 564, 568 (1998).
12 See
generally ALESINA & SPOLAORE, supra note 10; PETER
KATZENSTEIN, SMALL STATES IN WORLD MARKETS: INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN
EUROPE (1985).
13 See EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939).
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III
The pendulum swing back to a world in which the advantage
lies with the strong, who can muster large concentrations of
economic and demographic resources, was visible before the 2007
financial crisis. It has become much more evident since then. It has
been enunciated, rather brutally in Europe, by Germany’s Chancellor
Angela Merkel, when she laid out the conditions for aid to Greece in
the crisis of spring 2010 on May 19. She stated that “the rules must
not be oriented toward the weak, but toward the strong. That is a
hard message. But it is an economic necessity.”14 On the global scene,
we are now becoming obsessed with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India,
China) as new giants.15 The continuation of the crisis will turn them
into Big Really Imperial Countries. The future of globalization is thus
one in which power politics rather than markets will drive events.
That makes for competition, rather than cooperation, or what
Gideon Rachman calls a zero-sum view in a world of anxiety
replacing a win-win mindset in an age of optimism.16
The recent news that China has surpassed Japan as the
world’s second largest economy in GDP terms thus did not come as
a surprise.17 Japan is a big economy masking as a small state, with all
the aversion to the practical exercise of power that characterizes
second and third tier states. By contrast, China has always been about
greatness. The accelerated push of China to Great Power status is the
major geo-political outcome of the Great Recession of the early
14 Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, Address to the German
Bundestag on Measures to Stabilize the Euro (May 19, 2010) (transcript available at
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17042.pdf).
15 See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy et al., Seeking Greater Financial Clout, Emerging
Powers Prepare to Meet in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at A6
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/16/world/europe/16bric.html
(discussing
how the economies of the BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are
becoming the most powerful in the world, and challenging the United States in
economic supremacy).
16 See GIDEON RACHMAN, ZERO-SUM FUTURE: AMERICAN POWER IN
AN AGE OF ANXIETY (2011).
17 See, e.g., Chester Dawson & Jason Dean, Rising China Beats a Shrinking
Japan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2011, at A1, http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10001
424052748704593604576140912411499184.html.
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twenty-first century. That outcome carries economic hope but also
political fear.
First the good news about the new role of China: it lies—at
least up to now—in the economic side of the case. Alongside better
monetary policy and more flexible exchange rates between the big
industrial blocs, the response of China along with other big emerging
market economies to the world financial crisis is the central
explanation why the financial turbulence that emanated from the U.S.
subprime crisis did not completely destroy the world economy and
lead to a repeat of the 1930s Great Depression.
In the longer term the fallout from China’s stimulus may be
more mixed. Stabilizing the world economy is not a costless process,
as indeed it was not in the second half of the twentieth century for
the U.S. The holding of dollar assets, which probably constitute
around sixty-six percent of China’s current $2.7 trillion reserves,18 are
likely to produce a major book loss for the People’s Bank of China.
The domestic stimulus package which delivered a massive
underpinning of the world economy in the financial crisis, and which
also started a rebalancing of the global imbalances, will have
problematical repercussions. As well as public subsidies, largely for
infrastructure projects, the Chinese stimulus involved a vast
expansion of bank loans (some $1.5 trillion), which may become a
major problem for China’s banks.19 No less an authority than Prime
Minister Wen Jinbao stated:
In case of China, there is a lack of balance,
coordination and sustainability in the economic
development.
The main problems include the
unreasonable economic structure, weak capabilities
for scientific and technological innovation, rising
resources and environmental constraints, uneven
18 Angela Monaghan, China Fears Depreciation of $2.45 Trillion of Reserves
Still Heavy in Dollars, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (Sept. 3, 2010, 6:00 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/currency/7979268/China-fears-depreciationof-2.45-trillion-of-reserves-still-heavy-in-dollars.html.
19 See, e.g., Minxin Pei, Superpower Denied? Why China’s ‘Rise’ May Have Already
Peaked,
DIPLOMAT,
Aug.
9,
2012,
http://thediplomat.com/
2012/08/09/superpower-denied-why-chinas-rise-may-have-already-peaked/.
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urban-rural and regional development and lack of
coordination between economic and social
development.20
In the longer run, China will become obsessed with the challenge
posed by an aging population. Thus already at an early point in its rise
to preeminence, China is likely to be concerned with the sustainability
of its position.21
IV
The real challenge for China’s leaders will be to develop a
coherent view of the world that does not scare its neighbors—and
others. The Chinese dilemma today is not unlike the American one of
the mid-twentieth century. How can a new superpower maintain and
extend its power in a world playing by commercial rules? Its
effectiveness as a concentration of power, its sustainability as a state,
its ability to satisfy domestic claims all depend on an open world
economy. There are high costs if other states try to close themselves
off, and openness cannot be achieved simply at gunpoint.
In the 1930s, the United States did not stabilize the world
economy, and did not have a vision of the global order. That only
evolved in the 1940s and later, and in response to the very
fundamental challenges to human liberty and human dignity posed by
Hitler and then by Stalin. International relations scholars have
emphasized the extent to which international rules can be a way of
externalizing domestic preferences, a way of embedding a liberal
Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier, Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting of the New Champions (Sept. 13, 2010)
(transcript available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201009/13/c_13493041.htm); see also Arthur Waldron, Lauder Professor of Int’l Rel.,
Dep’t of Hist., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Tokyo Univ. Lecture, The Rise of China,
How Substantial? (Nov. 9, 2010).
21 See SUSAN SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (2007) (providing
skeptical insights about how China’s economic growth has caused China’s leadership to become vulnerable and insecure). See also YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE (2008)
(arguing that the vast economic and social disparities in China’s population will
pose a serious problem in years to come).
20
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order or of “tying one’s hands” that produces long term benefits for
domestic politics in that it defines an arena in which choices can be
made.22 The fact that the political system of the leading country is
open and decentralized is bolstered by the international order; and it
also acts as a guarantee to other powers that they have a mechanism
for advocacy of their own interests.23
China in the 2000s has contributed to a stabilization of the
world economy, but there is absolutely no sign that it is evolving a
vision of a new global order that goes beyond xìng zāi lè huò or
Schadenfreude, that the conventional platitudes of liberal and
democratic politics and economics are collapsing.
The key to whether the coming order is peaceful or not will
lie in the ability of Chinese leaders—and in general of those in the big
emerging economies—to encompass a vision that can provide an
adequate psychological foundation not just for commerce across
countries, but also for more profound levels of human exchange.
Globalization is not just about seizing and exploiting market
opportunities. In 2009, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China,
Zhou Xiaochuan, in a frontal attack on American hegemony
emphasized the importance of Confucianism, which values “thrift,
self-discipline, zhong yong or Middle Ground (low-key), and antiextravagancy.”24 This sounds like nostalgia for the Weberian
conception25 of a Protestant work ethic, which the West has lost or
abandoned.

See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTER-NATIONAL
SOCIETY (1996); see also Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., How Do
International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms, 40
INT’L STUDIES Q. 451 (1996).
23 See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 203-06 (2001).
24 Zhou Xiaochuan, On Savings Ratio, THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA
(Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/956/2009/20091229104
810768831191/20091229104810768831191_.html.
25 See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF
CAPITALISM AND OTHER WRITINGS (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells trans., Penguin Books 2002) (1930).
22
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Such appeals raise again Max Weber’s fundamental question
of how and why the work ethic is motivated, and in what ways it
corresponds to basic human proclivities.26 We cannot simply
understand economic life by observing its operation; we need to
think about an inner logic, and about how that logic corresponds
with the nature and the development of human character. In that
sense, the financial crisis has brought us back to basics. The Chinese
leadership understands this, but does not yet know how to respond.
It can see the Chinese setting very acutely, but not how that answer
can apply in a universe of values that are—well, universal.

26

See id.
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